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South Africa is facing a dual crisis of AIDS and
unemployment.1 According to the ASSA2002 demographic
model, by 2005 19% of adults (and 11% of all South Africans)
were HIV-positive. This amounts to a socioeconomic crisis of
significant proportions. AIDS undermines the economic
security of households by reducing the productivity of (and
eventually killing) mainly prime-age adults while
simultaneously diverting scarce household resources towards
health care. Poor households are especially vulnerable to these
shocks.2,3
In most of sub-Saharan Africa, where agriculture accounts for
a significant portion of employment and output, AIDS has
affected the poor mainly through its negative impact on
productivity in peasant agriculture.4 By contrast, South Africa’s
history of de-agrarianisation and the destruction of peasant
farming under apartheid have left the vast majority of
households dependent on wage labour.5 Under these
conditions, the negative impact of AIDS is experienced directly
through illness-induced retirement from wage-labour, and
indirectly through the contraction of employment
opportunities (especially unskilled jobs) by firms trying to
avoid AIDS-related costs (see Rosen and Simon6).
It is particularly tragic that South Africa’s AIDS epidemic is
occurring at a time when over a third of the labour force is
without work (Fig. 1). South Africa’s welfare system is
premised on full employment: there are means-tested grants
for those too old to work (the old age pension of R780 per
month) or too young to work (the child grant of R180 per
month), and for those who cannot work because they are
disabled (the disability grant of R780 per month) – but nothing
Fig. 1. Unemployment and HIV prevalence in South Africa.
Source – Nattrass.1
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for those who want to work but cannot find it. This ‘gap’ in the
social security net is one of the reasons for the significant
correlation between unemployment and poverty. 5,7 It is also,
as argued below, a problem for South Africa’s recently begun
‘rollout’ of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART).
WELFARE, AIDS AND DISABILITY IN SOUTH AFRICA
Disability grants are available to all ‘severely physically and
mentally disabled people’ older than 18 and younger than 65.
The system works according to a ‘medical model’ which
instructs those responsible for recommending patients for
disability grants to judge whether they are capable of working
– irrespective of whether work is available.8 People who are in
stage 4 of AIDS (i.e. are AIDS-sick) are eligible for the disability
grant (as long as they pass a fairly generous means test).
Disability grants need to be renewed by medical officers
(either every 6 months or every 5 years depending on the
grant). Someone on antiretroviral treatment who becomes
well enough to work should therefore expect to lose his or her
disability grant.9
Disability grants are an important source of income for AIDS-
affected households in South Africa.10 Recent survey evidence
from Khayelitsha, Cape Town, revealed that 8% of households
receive disability grants – and for those households, the grant
income comprises 52% of total household income. The
cancellation of disability grants therefore has serious
implications for household living standards. It also has serious
implications for the social position of people living with HIV.
Seventy-eight per cent of Khayelitsha respondents agreed
with the statement that ‘the disability grant helps people with
HIV be more accepted by their families’. There is therefore a
danger that those who lose their grants and are not able to
find work may find themselves experiencing higher levels of
stigma.
The loss of disability grant income has the following
implications for the  HAART rollout:
Many HAART patients will experience problems purchasing
food once their disability grants are cancelled.  People on
HAART need to eat regular, nutritious meals to enjoy
optimal health benefits. Loss of the disability grant could
compromise their health status (thereby shortening their
lives) and increase their viral loads (thereby rendering
them more infectious).
Those HAART patients who rely on their disability grants to
cover costs of transport to the clinics may find it difficult
to access their medication on a regular basis. 
Those living in places not yet reached by the rollout, and
who have been using their disability grants to pay for
HAART treatment through the private sector, will not be
able to continue their treatment once the grant is
cancelled.
Some clinicians worry that a significant minority of HAART
patients may choose to discontinue their treatment
regimens when their disability grants are cancelled so as
to become AIDS-sick again in order to qualify for the
disability grant once more. However, available evidence
suggests that only a small minority of people are likely to
consider this course of action.11 Nevertheless this issue
needs monitoring as it could reduce the effectiveness of
the rollout and encourage the growth of drug resistance.
POLICY OPTIONS
One response to the potential trade-off between the disability
grant and HAART is to remove the grant altogether for HIV-
positive people. This would at least remove the perverse
incentives described above. However, the cost is that it is
discriminatory (because people disabled by AIDS should not be
any less entitled to government support than any other
disabled person) and cuts away an important income lifeline
for poor AIDS-affected households. And, to the extent that
lower household income translates into lower food
consumption and fewer trips to the clinic, it would undermine
the effectiveness of the HAART rollout. To the extent that AIDS
is driven by poverty, it could also exacerbate the AIDS
epidemic.
An alternative response is to allow HIV-positive people to keep
their disability grants – even after their health has been
restored. There are two problems with the strategy. The first is
that the problem of perverse incentives is not eliminated.
Allowing access to the disability grant for people whose health
has been restored may even result in some people desiring to
become HIV-positive. Although this may sound far-fetched,
anecdotal evidence from the Western Cape, the Eastern Cape
and KwaZulu-Natal indicates that some people become angry
when they test negative – saying that they were hoping to get
the grant. In the Eastern Cape, there is a saying that you have
‘won the lotto’ if you test HIV-positive because it is seen as a
ticket to the disability grant. If antiretroviral treatment is
regarded (incorrectly) as a ‘cure’ for HIV, it is possible that
some people may desire to become HIV-positive under the
mistaken notion that they will be able to get access to the
disability grant and obtain antiretroviral treatment. 
The second problem with allowing HIV-positive people to keep
their disability grants even when their health has been
restored through HAART is a moral one: why should they be
privileged over other people who may be equally needy, but
HIV-negative? Put this way, the immediate question that
poses itself is: why not introduce a basic income grant (BIG)
for all? There is a range of arguments, both moral and
economic, in favour of a BIG in general (see e.g. Van Parys12)
and for South Africa in particular (see e.g. Standing and
Samson13). The perverse incentives associated with removal of
the disability grant amounts to one more argument in its
favour.
A BIG would need to be at a much lower level (probably in the
region of R100 - 200) than the R780 maximum grant for the
disabled. Households that lose the disability grant as a
consequence of antiretroviral treatment will at least have
some financial cushioning resulting from the fact that they,
and each household member, has a BIG. This may help prevent
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people on HAART from being tempted to stop adhering to their
treatment regimens in order to get the disability grant
reinstated.
If a BIG is introduced for all people – say at R100 a month –
what is the appropriate level of payment for the disability
grant?  Given that so much of the disability grant was used to
support the household (rather than just the individual), there
is an argument for a significantly reduced disability grant to
individuals once a BIG is introduced for all members of the
household. For example, in a five-person household,
household income would be the same if one disability grant
was available at R780 or if a BIG was available for all (at R100
each), and a disability grant was available at R280 to the
individual. The loss of a disability grant as a result of HAART
would thus result only in the loss of R280 a month. However,
given the necessity to support transport costs to and from the
clinic, and to ensure that people on HAART have adequate
nutrition, there is a case to be made to introduce a new grant
for those who are unemployed and on chronic medication.
Such a grant should probably be in the region of about R100.
This means that someone on HAART would get the BIG (R100)
plus the supplementary grant (R100). Their loss of income as a
consequence of going on HAART would thus only be from
R380 to R200.
THE COST OF INTRODUCING A BIG AND A LARGE-
SCALE HAART ROLLOUT
The introduction of a BIG of R100 a month could contribute
substantially to reducing poverty and inequality in South
Africa (e.g. Bhorat14). This is why the Taylor Committee report15
on comprehensive welfare reform argued in its favour.
According to Le Roux,16 a BIG could be financed by a 7.3
percentage point increase in value-added tax (VAT) and a 50%
increase in excise and fuel taxes. This proposal is broad-based
and redistributive: those who spend more than R1 000 a
month end up paying more in consumption taxes than they
benefit from the R100 BIG.
Earlier costing exercises using 2001 prices suggested that a
full-scale rollout would require an extra 1.4 – 3.2% of GDP per
year.3,17 The estimate deliberately assumed no rationing in the
public sector and (following the ASSA2000 Interventions
Model) a rollout to 90% of those who need treatment. It was
thus a high social benefit, high-cost scenario and as such was
the most expensive of the available South African costing
studies (see review in Boulle et al.18). The recent decline in drug
prices has made this argument all the more compelling. It
would now cost between 0.9% and 2.6% of GDP (depending
on the level of hospital care for HIV-positive people) to provide
a full-scale national HAART rollout.17 If we take the mid-point
estimate, this could be funded by raising VAT by 4 percentage
points.
Taken together with Le Roux’s estimates of the necessary tax
increase to finance a BIG, South Africa would need to raise tax
revenue by an equivalent of a 12 percentage point increase in
VAT to finance a BIG and implement a national AIDS
prevention and treatment intervention for all who need it.
This, of course, is a significant increase in taxation. Is this
feasible? There is no exact technical answer to this question, as
different societies tolerate different levels of taxation, and at
different times. Welfare expenditure as a proportion of GDP
has risen with economic development, and in times of crisis
(such as war) citizens have accepted large increases in taxation
as legitimate.19 The notion of what is and is not ‘affordable’
therefore varies according to the social and economic context.
Given the scale of the unemployment problem and the AIDS
epidemic, it is possible that reasonable South Africans might
agree to an increase in taxation to deal with it. Whether one
appeals to Rawlsian logic to protect the lives and livelihoods
of the poor – or to more radical left libertarian ideas of
providing each citizen with a social dividend as a basic right –
the issue ultimately boils down to whether reasonable people
can tolerate living in a society that forces people living with
AIDS to choose between income and health. 
Finally, it is important to note that even if a BIG and an
acceptable AIDS prevention and treatment intervention were
to be introduced, far more needs to be done to address the
problem of unemployment and poverty in South Africa. A BIG
of R100 a month is very small: it amounts to one-tenth of
average African per capita income, and to one-twentieth of
average per capita income in South Africa. Addressing poverty
through other means – most notably by encouraging labour-
intensive growth – must therefore be an integral part of any
solution.
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